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ON THE NATURE OF THE ACTION-OMISSION
NETWORK
Theodore Y. Blumoff*
INTRODUCTION: THE OMISSION LIABILITY NETWORK
I am solicited for help almost daily by strangers genuinely in need
of assistance or, more frequently, by associations acting on their
behalf. From supermarket entrances where good people espouse a
* Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Medical Education, Mercer University, Macon,
Georgia. Special thanks to Greg Chamber, Greg Jones, John Kleinig, Karen Kovach and Jack Sammons
for substantial help clarifying the issues, and to Jennifer Richter (Class of 2007) for early research
assistance and Megan Boyd (Class of 2008) for later help. Thanks also to the Georgia State University
Law Review for the kind invitation to present the work at this Symposium. As always, I am grateful to
Mercer University and Dean Daisy Floyd for continuing support.
** In this "network" each "node" (or actor) is directly and reciprocally connected with one another.
Although typically one or both parents would serve as a "connector" to the non-family service providers,
it routinely happens that each child also has a direct connection to the outside providers. See generally
ROBERT A. HANNEMAN & MARK RIDDLE, INTRODUCTION TO SOCtAL NETWORK METHODS (2005),
available at http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/--hanneman/nettext/.
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rich array of laudable causes to Red Cross email alerts describing the
need for famine or flood or (ubiquitously) disaster relief; to Doctors
Without Borders and Oxfam; to heart, kidney and diabetes
foundations, cancer societies, and children's illnesses of every
imaginable variety; to the disabled, the homeless, the abused and
neglected and more. Each solicitation triggers a brief, emotionally-
charged sensitivity to a familiar narrative of individuals in need, and
invariably they produce a sensation now well-wired in my
consciousness when so alerted. I know that many of these individuals
suffer significant deficits simply because of bad luck-antecedent,
constitutive and testing, economic, social, moral or otherwise.1 Yet I
mostly ignore these solicitations or quickly delete them or never
answer them (dispatched with telephonic dispassion), or I drop them
unopened into the trash with only that microsecond neural reaction
that causes hesitation. Why is that? Well for one, I can say that I have
only so much money and can't possibly contribute to every deserving
organization. True, but that explanation feels insufficient. I go to the
market or wine store and purchase a nice but unnecessary bottle of
Sauvignon Blanc or a Merlot and do so for my own pleasure. Surely
then, I ought to contribute something to each (or at least more) of
these worthwhile causes. Usually though, I do not. I allocate my
giving and I sleep well. Why such comfort?
*
David Hume was a careful observer of human behavior and he left
hints to my question's answer. His observations led to a view of
moral psychology that was underwritten necessarily (and, for him,
sufficiently) by our human natures: "[W]hat exists in the nature of
things is the standard of our judgment; what each man feels within
himself is the standard of sentiment." 2 What each person finds
"within," he concluded, is self interest and self love, and he regarded
1. See THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (Cambridge 1979) (describing
different forms of moral luck).
2. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 171 (L. A. Selby-Bigge
& P. H. Nidditch, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 3rd ed. 1975) (1777) [hereinafter HUME, PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS].
[Vol. 24:4
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ACTION-OMISSION NETWORK
these qualities as inhabiting the core of human morality.3 Within the
"nature of things" is a powerful tendency to rescue our child or
spouse or sibling or loved one far more readily than to come to the
aid of a neighbor or a person unknown.4 Yet we do provide
substantial assistance to our friends, especially those we love, to
those who demonstrably lack sufficient capacity, and sometimes we
even provide aid to strangers in need whom we have a unique ability
to assist but with whom we never have, and likely never will have
any contact.5 And, as we know from common experience, we are
more likely to stop and give aid to an injured person within our
immediate reach than we are to heed yet another call to help the
injured and destitute in a far away land, although their need for
assistance may be exactly the same as the needs of those proximate to
us.
Hume acknowledged that although we are driven mostly by our
own interests, we are not indifferent to the suffering of our fellow
beings, even those with whom we have no connection. Our
sympathies with humanity are substantial, and they are evinced in
ways that are consistent with, although not fully driven by, conduct
evolutionary biologists associate with "kinship selection," that is, the
likelihood of individual members of any species to cooperate with
their biologically close kin to advance inclusive fitness, 6 and
"reciprocal altruism," cooperative sharing among non-related
individuals in a group.7 Hume concluded that our feelings of
3. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 488 (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch,
eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 2nd ed. 1978) [hereinafter HUME, TREATISE]; see also David Hume, Of
the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature, in SELECTED ESSAYS 43, 43--44 (Stephen Copley & Andrew
Edgar eds., Oxford 1993).
4. See HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 481.
5. Adam Smith began his treatise on morality with the famous statement, "[h]ow selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in.. . others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing
it." ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1759). Smith
used the term "sympathy... to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever." Id. at 5.
6. See, e.g., John Maynard Smith, Group Selection and Kin Selection, 21 NATURE 1145, 1145
(1964); Francis Steen, Natural Selection: Exposition, Examples, Discussion (1998),
http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/Selection.html.
7. William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior, 12 AM. NATURALIST 354 (1963). See
generally FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND
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obligation radiate in a network-like fashion outward from ourselves,
first to our immediate progeny and mate, our closest genetic relatives,
and then to more distant family and relations. The valence of the
emotional, moral, and legal connections tend to diminish as kinship
and status become more remote.8 Hume came to a well-reasoned, pre-
Darwinian observation of evolutionary psychology. And he went
further because he was also sensitive to a less biologically-driven and
more traditional form of altruism: "What is [sic] honourable, what is
fair, . . . what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the
heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it."9 And so, he
argued, we are moved by what is within us, by what is useful to us
and to others, and by the needs of those who are important to us.
"Usefulness" thus embraces our moral sentiments and our moral
psychology.
Hume understood that we are, in fact, animals, subject (at least
initially) to the tendencies that move other animals. Like most other
animals, our natural preferences, from a moral perspective, begin
with those closest to us, although we do harbor deep feelings about
the welfare of other, less closely related and unrelated individuals.
From an evolutionary point of view, we have come to recognize that
many actions that we could label "duties" include a substantial
amount of conduct that, to us individually, is measured as a dis-
utility, i.e., an apparent present loss of personal fitness that is not
clearly recoverable somewhere down the road.'0 And we often fail to
OTHER ANIMALS 12, 24-27 (1996); Jim Moore, The Evolution of Reciprocal Sharing, 5 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLoGY 5 (1984), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/-jmoore/publications/Recip.htnl.
8. Noting that any behavior that advances genetic fitness is evolutionarily advantageous, J.B.S.
Haldane famously quipped, "I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins." Gaden S.
Robinson, Society Insects, TIMES ONLINE, July 25, 2007 (Book Review),
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts-and-entertainment/thetls/tlsselections/natural-history/a
rticle2306055.ece.
9. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 172.
10. See, e.g., Andy Gardner & Stuart A. West, Cooperation and Punishment, Especially in Humans,
164 AM. NATURALIST 753 (2004), available at
http://westgroup.biology.ed.ac.uk/pdf/Gardner&West_AmNatO4.pdf.
1006 |VoL 24:4
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ACTION-OMISSION NETWORK
live up to our obligations and are probably doomed to fail at times in
the future. Why that might be is the subject of this work."
This work explores the foundations of a deeply felt intuition that
pervades American jurisprudence: the act-omission distinction
("AvO"). I conclude that Hume's understanding of the origins of our
conception of duties presaged an important insight from modem
evolutionary theory: 12 our tendency to engage in altruistic conduct
begins, although it clearly does not end, with the physical reality of
personal kinship in an unkind world, and it tends to extend out in a
social network of ever-diminishing strength the farther we move from
the nuclear family.' 3 The thesis begins with the observation that we
privilege "acts" over "omissions" for purposes of accountability,
because the "psychological constituents of human ... nature, like the
anatomical and physiological elements thereof, exhibit adaptive
design for the solution of particular recurrent problems faced by our
ancestors."'14 Given the fact that we are still freighted with a million
year old genotype, we should not be surprised that we continue to
find it easier to help individuals close to us than perfect strangers and,
in either case, especially easier to give aid if the individual is close at
hand. Accountability for omissions tends to arise as a function of
11. For the purposes of this work only, I am assuming that we can characterize acts versus omissions
non-controversially. Of course, very often these distinctions cannot be made in a non-controversial way
and then it is fair to ask what other factors are motivating a court's decision. I do not think that fact
undermines my concerns, which are with the norm itself, not how well or poorly it is implemented.
12. In fact, Darwin described Hume as a "central influence" in his thinking. William Edward Morris,
David Hume, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/hume/. In a section titled "Man as a Social Animal,"
Darwin expressly mentions Hume's Principles of Morals for the proposition that man has retained the
ape-like instinct of his progenitors to have "love and sympathy for his fellows." CHARLES DARWIN, THE
DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX, 132 n. 23 (Penguin ed. 2004).
13. Aristotle seemed to have something of this idea in mind in Book VIII of the Nicomachean
Ethics, when he described the natural friendships that develop between parents and children across
species. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 209 (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford 2002). See generally
Dascher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Social Functions of Emotions, in EMOTIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 192 (Tracy J. Mayne & George A. Bonnano eds., Guilford Press 2001), available
at http://people.virginia.edu/-jdh6n/ (noting the problem-solving social functions served by the
emotions, and synthesizing evolutionary and social constructivist theories of emotion).
14. Margo Wilson, Martin Daly & Nicholas Pound, An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on
the Modulation of Competitive Confrontation and Risk-Taking, 5 HORMONES, BRAIN, & BEHAV. 381,
381 (2002).
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relationally proximate networks, and among the salient variables that
determine the expectations within these networks are, in the first
instance at least, kinship and the power-knowledge imbalances that
often exist among individuals in trusting and entrusting
relationships. 15 Thus our parents and siblings and our lawyers and
doctors and priests have duties to aid that even our best friends do not
have. 16 I argue that these variables and, in particular, our largely
ineradicable biological commitment to those who are in close familial
relationships, are grounded initially in our genetic ties and thus favor
our individual natural histories. Overcoming the traditional reluctance
to impose duties to act on behalf of third parties will require some
remodeling of our social norms.
I hope to demonstrate these points in several steps. Part I removes
some of the underbrush with a brief vignette that sets the distinction
between acts and omissions as sources of duty and accountability in a
plausible hypothetical setting. The purpose of this section is simply to
dissect the apparent moral obtuseness of AvO in terms of legal
"causation." It concludes, as many others have, that omissions that
produce non-trivial harms can be as fully responsibility-engendering
as are dynamic acts that cause harm. Thus, to label the conduct in
question a "mere omission" is to make a judgment about the
culpability of the individual; it is not a statement about material
causation. This is not a matter of ambiguity in the term "causation";
rather, it speaks to our intuitions about the propriety of accountability
for failing to render aid.
Part II puts the issue of liability based on duties in its
contemporary perspective. It thus begins with a summary of the legal
concept of "duty," the existence of which is a necessary condition for
15. This finding is also well supported among primatologists. See, e.g., DE WAAL, supra note 7, at
ch. 2; Joan B. Silk, et al., Chimpanzees are Indifferent to the Welfare of Unrelated Group Members, 437
NATURE 1357 (2005).
16. This might also explain why adoptive parents, males in particular, are more likely to harm their
stepchildren than are biological parents. See, e.g., Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, An Evolutionary
Perspective on Homicide, in HOMICIDE STUDIES: A SOURCEBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 58, 64 (D.
Smith & M. Zahn eds., Sage Publications 1999) ("Evolutionary thinking led to the discovery of the most
important risk factor for child homicide---the presence of a stepparent."); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997).
1008 [Vol. 24:4
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omission liability. 17 The recognition of a legal duty begins (and ends)
with an assessment of status relationships, which are defined by
contexts where, as a matter of long term survival, there are and
always have been situations in which power, trust, and knowledge
imbalances exist. In particular, recognition of a duty occurs where
there is a first-order (or other close) kinship relationship (i.e.,
spouses, parent-child, child-child, and sometimes child-parent) that
requires the superior party to aid the weaker party to assure
survival. 18 Part II then outlines several of the principal assumptions
of evolutionary theory, and some basic behavioral genetic and
neuroscientific data on the anatomy of moral decision-making, and
ends with a discussion of selection, the creation of memory, and the
satisfaction of pre-existing duties. What I suggest is that over the vast
expanse of human history, the imposition of a duty has its roots in a
genotype that extends back to the Pleistocene era and our subsequent
neurobiological development-in short, its foundation lies in a family
social network. As family relationships have become more attenuated
over time, duties have been imposed on other trusted surrogates.
There are many conditions that circumscribe our behavior, a point
made in Part III, which ties these neurobiological findings to the
naturalistic moral psychology of Hume, whose insights support our
tendency to impose responsibility based on certain omissions that
cause harm. 19 Part III draws together the several strands into a
naturalistic account of the intuition that produces AvO and ties those
intuitions to the social network that helps to account for AvO. Part IV
17. I will use examples from general criminal and tort law throughout this work, but the legal
analysis works as well (albeit in different substantive and remedial ways) with issues that arise in
Bioethics and Medical Ethics. See, e.g., Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Pub. Health, 497
U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (discussing the AvO distinction); Barber v. Super. Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
1016 (1983); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
18. European countries tend to have a somewhat different tradition; they generally impose a statutory
duty to rescue if it can be effectuated without great risk to the rescuer and without compromising other
existing duties. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, § 323c, available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#323c. Perhaps this is a historical legacy of greater
homogeneity.
19. I deal here with negligent omissions, which are generally inadvertently produced. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. c (defining negligent
omissions).
20081 1009
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highlights the Humean framework, puts it into a social network
analysis, and offers some observations about the future of AvO and
the possibility of remodeling our public norms so that a duty to
rescue when we can do so without unreasonable effort becomes an
implied term in the social contract because everyone's children are
entitled to civil treatment and respect.
I. A GROUNDING HYPOTHETICAL FOR AvO
20
Charlie is a veteran railroad switchman. One evening he's sitting
on a well worn gray sofa in one of the railroad's many small,
rundown yard shacks anticipating an important football game and a
visit from an old friend, Frank. The shack has a television sitting on a
small comer table. Just moments before the game begins, Charlie
turns to his buddy and nodding toward the large, well-marked switch
to his right declares, "Frank, I gotta pull that A switch over there at
9:02. Now, don't let me forget to do it or the L&W's gonna crash
straight into Amtrak's Boston Flyer." Frank glances at his watch, then
the switch and nods affirmatively. The game starts at 8, and it's close
and unbelievably exciting; it rivets their attention as the lead changes
several times. At 9:04, the L&W Freight-line Express crashes head-
on into Amtrak's Boston Flyer, just as Charlie had predicted, and just
as Frank understood. Now people are dead and lives and businesses
throughout the country are in disarray. Charlie failed to pull the A
switch because both he and Frank forgot. Forgetting, a condition of
negligent empty-headedness, begat a failure to act. Destruction
followed. We expected better from Charlie.
But suppose we are living in a state in which all of one's
sensibilities are consumed each day with staying alive. Social
networks of human interactions extending beyond the nuclear
community would have been unfathomable. In that setting, one's
ability to conceive of moral dilemmas related to saving unknown and
20. The vignette that follows is adapted from Patricia Smith, Legal Liability and Criminal
Omissions, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 69, 101 (2001).
1010 [Vol. 24:4
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unrelated others are non-existent. Subsistence is incredibly difficult.
Great cats and immense predatory mammals and lizards roam the
earth. Distant ancestors would have been knee-deep in self- and kin-
preservation: just feeding one's small community would demand the
labor of every healthy adult (males hunting and females gathering
and child-rearing, most of the time). Existence and reproduction
require the immediate and continual cooperation of those in close
contact with one another. Rescuing someone outside one's small
group is not part of anyone's fare, and answering solicitations from
charitable organizations acting on behalf of those in desperate need of
financial assistance was inconceivable. Our present ability to engage
in moral reasoning evolved from a genotype that was driven by a
primitive neurobiological architecture that valued kinship and mutual
back-scratching long before our co-evolved culture emerged.
Today, of course, we do not hesitate to find Charlie responsible
both materially and proximately for the spectacular crash. His
omission is culpable because his very livelihood-his role as one
among many guardians of the community-entails the expectation,
memorialized in his job description, that he remembers in a timely
manner to begin the processing that produces the action of throwing
the switch. We have entrusted to him the role of guardian of these
rails. Experience, reflected in part in our neurobiological
development, has taught us that the interposition of an individual
capable of and tasked with preventing a harm, and presented with an
opportunity to do so without sacrificing other duties, should activate
that individual's duty to prevent the harm. Failure to do so then
produces the inescapable impression that an unnecessary and
unwelcome event has occurred and that it did not have to occur. This
impression arises even if we do not know, and have no kinship or
close relationship with the victims. Given the nature of Charlie's
employment agreement and the expectations that accompany it,
moreover, we would probably say that he was grossly neglectful. His
omission to do so causes us to view him as a cause of the train wreck
under any reasonable, common sense, role-governed description of
Charlie's conduct.
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The easy determination that Charlie's omission was a cause of the
train wreck and is justly responsible therefore, introduces another
apparent causal conclusion. If we concede that Charlie's failure of
memory and the consequent failure to pull the switch was an
omission that caused the wreck, then perhaps we should think about
Frank's role in the tragedy too. For one thing, there is no obvious
difference in either intention (or lack thereof) or material causation
between Charlie's failure to remember and Frank's failure to remind.
Put it in context: physically, they sit side by side on the sofa in the
yard house. Both understand the implications of Charlie's warning,
and both are located no more than a few feet from the switch. Their
respective expectations of the potential consequences are the same as
both are watching the football game when, at 9:04, the actually
foreseen (in fact, predicted) train wreck occurs. 2 1 In this context, their
failures of memory seem indistinguishable from the perspective of
causation. Thus, from the viewpoint of intentionality, both have full
knowledge that the trains will crash and cause great harm if the A
switch is not pulled in a timely manner. And, finally, both have
ample opportunity and the ability to pull it, but both suffered a failure
of memory and so both were at least inadvertent: Charlie for failing
to pull the switch and Frank for failing to remember to remind his
friend to pull the switch. On this view of causation, where causative
powers are understood as including intentions (broadly defined) that
trigger beliefs which then effectuate unwelcome outcomes, legal
causation speaks loudly to the relationship between human inactions
and accountability. Charlie as well as Frank are causative agents
21. There is another imaginable scenario-namely, that the train was behind schedule and Charlie (or
Frank) remembered to throw the switch before the crash occurred. That is, one or the other threw the
switch "in time," but late (after 9:02) and without harm. If that possible scenario does not describe
"moral luck," I am at a loss to explain how moral luck might otherwise be described. On the question of
moral luck, see Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 38 (Cambridge 1979)
(originally published in 50 PROC. ARIST. SOC'Y (Supp. 1976)); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 24 (Cambridge 1981) (rejecting the Kantian
hypothesis that good or bad will is "unconditioned" [or] ... free from external contingency"); Bernard
Williams, Moral Luck: A Postscript, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 1982-1993, 241, (Cambridge 1995).
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unless inaction is, for some reason, less forgivable in one context
than another.
In one obvious sense, there is greater reason to attribute failure and
accountability to Charlie rather than to Frank: Charlie failed to satisfy
a recognized, pre-existing legal duty to pull the switch. The idea of
duty embraces a comprehensive moral and legal obligation to act in a
timely fashion. In light of his position, its remuneration, the
expectations that follow there from, and (ultimately) our sense of
what is right, an employee like Charlie is charged in morality and
law with remembering. Frank does not bear the burden that
accompanies such entrustment. 22 So, the existence of a duty makes a
significant difference in our willingness to attribute fault, which
follows from our expectations of their respective conduct. But
differences in obligations, expectations, and attributions of fault do
not make an obvious difference in terms of material causation; that is,
role expectations aside, the reason why we infer that B, a train crash,
invariably follows A, the fact that trains heading towards each from
opposite directions on the same track at night will crash unless active
measures are taken to prevent the collision.23 If either Charlie or
Frank had remembered the task in a timely fashion or had
remembered "late" and jumped up at the very last second and pulled
the switch, the wreck probably would not have happened. In fact,
Charlie and Frank are each causally sufficient in these
circumstances.24 The existence of a duty, then, seems to speak to
22. Generally, he is not so charged, which is not to say that our understanding of "duty" is or should
be static. It too evolves, although it does so slowly, within the root categories, and under much
questioning. In at least one case, friendship seemed to be sufficient to trigger a duty. See, e.g., Farwell v.
Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220-22 (Mich. 1976) (finding a "special relationship" sufficient to impose a
duty to render aid based on a "social venture" that involved an evening out for two buddies sharing a
few beers). On the questions this case has raised, see, for example, Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to
Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 651 (2002) (noting that "not all courts have
accepted a social venture as a special relationship that qualifies as an exception to the general rule," after
discussing Farwell v. Keaton) (citation omitted). Cf Ronald M. v. White, 169 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that defendant passengers had no duty to intervene and were not liable for injuries
suffered by co-passengers in a car accident after a night consuming drugs and alcohol).
23. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, § VII, pt. II-Ill (L. A.
Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1975).
24. Other contingencies could have arisen that would have prevented the crash, such as a cow
straying onto the track or a mechanical failure of some sort.
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another issue, and not (at least not only) to material causation, but to
causal attributions based on inadvertence.
II. DUTIES AND THEIR EVOLUTION
Such "duties" as existed in the human evolutionary past were
likely related to the need of all individuals to help themselves and
their kin survive and reproduce. The ability to pass on one's genetic
material, his or her "fitness," occupied virtually all of one's
resources. 25 As the products and creators of culture, we have come a
long way from the origins of our genotypes. Our genotypes, however,
are largely unchanged because changes due to natural selection occur
over millions of years. 26 With that in mind, this section begins with
the current status of duties as a trigger for omission liability in law,
and then backtracks. This provides a basis for distinguishing between
acts and omissions for purposes of establishing criminal and civil
liability by discussing natural selection; the evolutionary and
neuroanatomical bases of moral judgments; the impact of
evolutionary theory on duty; and the impact of memory on the
creation of and our ability to fulfill the obligations imposed by duties.
A. Established Anglo-American Legal Principles.
The simple failure to act, even in the circumstances in which a
person of reasonable moral fiber would do so and could do so without
25. See Robert Boyd, Evolution: The Puzzle of Human Sociality, 314 SCIENCE 1555, 1555-56 (2006)
(suggesting that "[1]anguage or culture may have led to the evolution of leveling mechanisms, which
then potentiated the spread of prosocial genes because these mechanisms reduced the costs of
cooperation."). See also PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES' BABY: HOW THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
EXPLAINS WHAT MAKES Us HUMAN 105 (2004) ("Successful genes will create vehicles [for
reproduction] that are altruistic toward different kin in degrees that reflect the chance of the kin sharing
genes."); MICHAEL R. ROSE, DARWIN'S SPECTRE: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY IN THE MODERN WORLD 70
(1998) (describing "fitness" as "net reproductive output"). Even our founding story in the West is
Darwinian to the core; Genesis is consumed with issues related to reproductive success. See Genesis.
26. See, e.g., Daly & Wilson, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that "ancestral environments" are stressed
because the psychology and morphology of every species are "historical artifacts, designed by natural
selective process that required persistent relationships between cue and consequence through many
generations."); see Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer (1997), available
at http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html.
1014 [Vol. 24:4
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1014 2007-2008
 I    [  
  
. 
. I     
 i s"  
li el  r l t  t  t    ll i i i l  t     
t ir i  i   .  
t i l,  s,"  
r r .      
l    t  i i    
 l l      
r illi   ?6   
t  t     
 t  t .   i   
t   i i      
li ilit   i i  t l l ti ;   
r t i l   ts; f 
l ti r  t r   t ;     
r ti  f  r ilit  t  l ill t  ti s  
. t lished l i   i ciples. 
 i l  f il r  t  t,  stances   
rs  f r l  r l i  l    t 
25. See obert , v l ti :  l   UTlUl  ocialit ,   , -56  
(suggesting that "[I]anguage or culture a  a e l  t  t  l ti   l li  i , i  
t e  te tiate  t  s r   r i l    is s  t  f 
cooperation."). See also P L , TES' : ow  I   I   
E PL I S T S s   ( 04) (" ssful  ill te i les r 
reproduction] that are altruistic to ard different kin in degrees that reflect t e c a ce f t e i  s ring 
genes."); IC EL . S , I 'S : I  I  I      
(1998) (describing "fitness" as " et re r ductive t t ).  r i  t ry  st  
Darwinian to the core; enesis is consu ed ith issues related to re r cti e s ccess.  sis. 
26. See, e.g., aly & ilson, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that "ancestral e ir ents" r  stressed 
because the psychology and morphology of every species are "historical artifacts, designed by natural 
selective process that required persistent relationships bet een cue and consequence through a y 
generations."); see Leda Cos ides  John ooby, volutionary sychology:  rimer ( 997), il l  
at http:// .psych.ucsb.edulresearch/cep/primer.htrnl. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/1
ACTION-OMISSION NETWORK
compromising other duties, is generally insufficient to impose either
punishment or compensatory liability. Under the traditional common
law view of liability for failure to act, the actor must violate a legal
duty. In Jones v. United States, for example, the court held that the
failure to instruct the jury that the defendant in whose home the
events occurred had a legal duty to provide food to an infant in her
home.27 The court described the four circumstances in which a duty
and potential liability for failing to meet the duty generally arises.
One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a
duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a certain status
relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a contractual
duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily
assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to
prevent others from rendering aid.28
In each of these cases, either the legislature or common law judges
have made a judgment that the individual upon whom the duty is
imposed is in a relationship of kinship or trust under circumstances in
which the beneficiary of the duty needs aid for his or her well-being.
Of significance here are the second and third categories: the existence
of a status relationship or a contractual duty.
In tort law, the rules are similar. In his classic treatise, Dean
Prosser states that the "simple and obvious" distinction between
misfeasance (acting wrongly) and nonfeasance (wrongly omitting) is
made difficult because the latter requires finding "some definite
relation between the parties, of such a character that social policy
justifies the imposition of a duty to act."29 Consider the classic case
of Yania v. Bigan where the defendant failed to come to the aid of a
business acquaintance whom he (the defendant) had induced to jump
27. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
28. Id. at 310 (footnotes omitted). Defendant had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter
although the jury had never been told what duty, if any, she had failed to satisfy. There was evidence,
which the defendant contested, from which the jury could have found that the defendant was under
either a contractual obligation to care for the child or that she had voluntarily taken care of the child. The
jury was not required to find either, which was reversible error.
29. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 339 (4th ed. 1971). Despite his
understanding that the distinction is justified by policy, he does not question the formal need (or not) to
find a "relation," surely a sufficiently soft term to require the question.
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into a deep, water-filled trench, and as a result of his inaction the
acquaintance drowned.3 ° In a suit brought by the deceased man's
wife, the court sustained a motion to dismiss, denying even potential
liability for negligence, and holding held that "[tihe mere fact that
Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him
no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue."
31
The fact that Bigan had induced Yania, a competent adult (not a
ward) to jump into the trench was brushed aside as meritless. 32 He
was not deemed to be in need of assistance because he freely chose to
jump. No duty, therefore, no accountability: Charlie is liable, Frank is
not. Frank exercises no power or authority or legal control in the
situation. No one expects Frank to protect the railroad, its users or the
territory through which it runs and hence he bears no duty; he is
outside the network of individuals charged with responsibility.
What is important in terms of the imposition of a duty in the third
category is the existence of a "status relation," according to which
something about the connection between the neglectful actor and the
context is sufficiently close and personal to charge him or her with a
legal obligation by virtue of the expectations of the position the actor
occupies. These relationships are based (at least in part) on our
natures and on the closeness of the relationships, on disparities in
knowledge and authority (broadly defined), and on dependence and
survival. We tend to define these dependent power relations in terms
of control (e.g., master-servant, common carrier-passenger),
knowledge imbalances (e.g., physician-patient, attorney-client,
clergy-penitent, parent-child), and kinship/intimacy (first and
foremost, duties and immunities between parent and child, but also
30. Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. 1959). The court did not consider the "business" part of
the description "business acquaintance," when doing so might have produced a different analysis if not a
different result. Id. at 345; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). If the court had
considered this relationship, it might have saddled the landowner, Bigan, with a duty of reasonable care
toward Yania. It is not clear, however, that the content of that duty would require him to either refrain
from taunting Yania in the first place or to rescue him if he did jump.
31. Yania, 155 A.2d at 343, 346.
32. Id. at 345 (stating "to contend that such (enticing and cajoling] conduct directed to an adult in
full possession of all his mental faculties constitutes actionable negligence is not only without precedent
but completely without merit").
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between spouses, clergy and penitent, and physician and patient). In
light of the depth and reciprocal nature of these relationships, we
routinely impose status-related duties.33 What is the normative source
of that conclusion?
B. Evolutionary Perspectives.
The common law imposes a duty to act, the failure of which is
punishable by imprisonment or financial responsibility. Under the
traditional view, this duty arises not only when an actor operates
within a recognized status relationship, but also when he acts under a
contract to provide services. From this perspective, Charlie's liability
is clear: He failed to do the very job he was hired to do and his
liability is based on his employment contract. But why not impose a
duty on Charlie's friend Frank who, by hypothesis, was aware of the
danger and fully able to prevent its occurrence? Why is his status as a
friend and knowledgeable bystander an insufficient basis for
imposing a duty to remind Charlie? The origin of the answer rests in
evolutionary theory, the neurobiology of learning, and the
expectations that flow there from. This section begins with some
fairly unobjectionable assumptions that underlie the field of
evolutionary psychology.
1. Some assumptions underlying evolutionary psychology.
This subsection begins by setting out some of the presuppositions
that underlie the evolutionary approach to legal analysis. The major
point of this approach is to align the law's model of human behavior
more closely with the way in which individuals actually behave, and
the reasons therefore, thus testing our intuitions against our history.
34
33. See, e. g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 193 n.9 (8th ed. 2007) (setting out the traditional role relationships
that impose a duty). See generally John Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Failures to Act, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 405, 423 (2005); Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (2006).
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(A) Human beings, like every species of every genus, have evolved
through the process of natural selection. This process reflects millions
of years of adaptation such that the basic architecture of our anatomy
and physiology is itself millions of years in the making. As creatures
of natural selection, maintaining "fitness," the ability to reproduce
our phenotypic design, is a never-ending procedure.35
(B) The brain and the mind are the products of this enormously
complex process, and they too generally reflect functional
adaptations to the environment in which they evolved.36 Moreover,
the "psychological constituents of human . . . nature, like the
anatomical and physiological elements thereof, exhibit adaptive
design for the solution of particularly recurrent problems faced by our
ancestors., 37  Decisions we make today are the product of
neurobiological mechanisms whose architecture was initially
acquired in a primitive stage of humankind.38
35. Excellent introductions to this topic for lay people (like me) include STEVE JONES, THE
LANGUAGE OF GENES: SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF OUR GENETIC PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1993);
MARK RIDLEY, THE COOPERATIVE GENE: How MENDEL'S DEMON EXPLAINS THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEX BEINGS (2001); and MICHAEL R. ROSE, DARWIN'S SPECTRE: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY IN
THE MODERN WORLD (1998).
36. The distinction between brain and mind (our seat of self-consciousness) is one of great interest,
and one I am now addressing in a paper tentatively titled, Normative Neuroscience and Criminal Law.
Suffice it to say that I think there are gaps between intention and neuronal firings that we may never
eliminate as sources of inquiry. JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION ch. 3 (2001). There is some
evidence to believe, moreover, that the gap is filled, in part, by ion activity at the quantum level.
JEFFREY M. SCHWARTZ & SHARON BEGLEY, THE MIND & THE BRAIN: NEUROPLASTICITY AND THE
POWER OF MENTAL FORCE ch. 8 (2002). Because I believe that it is neurons all the way down, there
must be another question, also all the way down, and that question addresses the nature and source of
human intellectual curiosity. As to how it might work, in which consciousness, an epiphenomenon, is
embedded in complex networks of neural substrata that are causative, see GERALD M. EDELMAN,
WIDER THAN THE SKY: THE PHENOMENAL GIFT OF CONSCIOUSNESS ch. 7 (2004) (describing
consciousness as a "phenomenal transform," whereby neural activities enable the higher order
distinctions that make possible our ability to experience qualia).
37. See Wilson et al., supra note 14.
38. Owen Jones refers to this phenomenon as "Time-Shifted Rationality," the idea being that our
ability to process our cultural experiences occurs in brains that evolved under very different
circumstances than we face today. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's
Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) (arguing
that what we perceive as irrationalities are often likely to be products of a temporal mismatch between
the environment in which natural selection shaped the brain to function and different, modem
environments that technology has only recently enabled us to study). I would add to his general
description only that this shift in decision-making continues to occur within a selectional system that
includes both the ongoing temporal and repositioning effects of natural selection and how those effects
[Vol. 24:4
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(C) The architectural designs of our neuroanatomy (our cerebral
cortex and sub-cortical mechanisms) and our neurophysiology
(neurotransmitters, hormones and their regulators, and the like)-our
phenotype-reflects our genotype as it continually responds to the
actual environments in which we live. 39 A fuller understanding of
how we make decisions, therefore, requires that we take into account
the fact that the human genotype came into being to solve problems
which, for most of us, are no longer a matter of survival.
(D) Many of the features that constitute human decision-making
are inaccessible to us through introspection because "the
phenomenology of deliberation and reasoned choice is often illusory
and reconstructive." 40 This is not to say that our information
processing is simply a helter-skelter, ad hoc affair; it is not. We do
plan and introspect and use our cognitive resources. It is to claim,
however, that our information processing mechanisms are not
entirely apparent even when we attempt to introspect on how those
mechanisms operate.
(E) Evolution and adaptation are on-going phenomena. The once
prevailing wisdom that the adult brain was hard-wired and fixed,
immune to change is simply wrong. Neuroplasticity, the ability of
neurons in the brain to generate new connections and rewire or
remodel the brain, is never ending, although it is sometimes more
limited in adults than in children.41
2. Behavioral genetics and neuroscience.
The naive folk and legal views of our genetic endowment miss
many of the points just made. These views describe genetic
operate neurobiologically (and on balance) to produce some standard deviation of the population who
have or perceive themselves as having a small chance of success, i.e., inclusive fitness.
39. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & BEGLEY, supra note 36 (discussing efforts to reprogram patients
suffering with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION,
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 11 (Penguin Books 2005) (1994).
40. Wilson et al., supra note 14, at 383.
41. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & BEGLEY, supra note 36 (detailing the history of the overthrow of the
once conventional wisdom); ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE WISDOM PARADOX: HOW YOUR MIND CAN
GROW STRONGER As YOUR BRAIN GROWS OLDER (2005).
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development through the simile of a blueprint-an algorithm that
determines the direction and shape of all future development.42 Genes
play a crucial part in the timing and direction of an individual's
development. They are only one part, however, and some small
amount of our DNA does in fact insure that the overwhelming
majority of us are bom with all and only the right parts and mostly in
the "right" places.43 But our genes also have significant roles in our
ongoing development; that is to say, they do far more than determine
when puberty begins, when our hair grays, when our chins begin to
drop, and so on. Crucially, the vast majority of our genome, acting
like the immune system, exists to begin reactions to our
environments, whatever they may be, in an adaptive way: "The
function of many genes is... to switch other genes on or off. And the
susceptibility of a gene to be switched on or off depends on the
sensitivity of its promoters;" that is, on a type of genetic material that
facilitates the production of proteins when other genetic materials
("transcription factors") attach.44 On the neurobiological view of
42. But see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (resting its holding that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the execution of minors, in part, on
the fact that juvenile brain development is immature with respect to decision-making and impulse
control).
43. Of the roughly three billion chemical bases that compose a molecule of DNA, the most
commonly cited figure indicates that the human genome is roughly 99.9% identical among all homo
sapiens everywhere. See, e.g., National Institute of Health, Genes & Population, available at
http://publications.nigms.nih.gov/genepop/qanda.html; American Museum of Natural History, Our
Genetic Identity, available at http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/genomics/1-identity/ninety nine.html.
Of those three billion bases-the familiar A, T, G and C-only a small percentage actually code for
proteins that provide something akin to a blueprint. The rest were, until recently, disparaged as "junk
DNA." See, e.g., Gerton Lunter, Non-genic Evolution and Selection in the Human Genome or: "Junk
DNA ", available at http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/--hein/HumanGenome/hg.pdf (summarizing recent
literature and putting the figure at 98.5%); W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: The Gems of Junk'
DNA, 289 SCt. AM. 46 (Nov. 2003) available at http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/JunkDNAl 11903.htm
(putting the percentage of protein coding DNA at 2%); John Mattick, The Hidden Genetic Program of
Complex Organisms Sci. AM., Sept. 2004, at 61, available at
http://www.rpgroup.caltech.edu/-natsirtME96/RNA.pdf. Their potential explanatory power is just now
being uncovered.
44. MArt RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND WHAT MAKES Us HuMAN 32
(2003). Estimates vary slightly but the current thinking is that only 3-5% of our DNA exists to code for
specific protein production. The remaining 95% or so lie in wait, reacting to environmental input before
springing into adaptive action. See, e.g., Gibbs supra note 43; Scientists Explore Function of "Junk
DNA," SCI. DAILY (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/1 1/061113180029.htm.
For a technical description of the operation of transcription factors, see, for example, Transcription
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humankind, each of us is literally a work-in-progress so that who an
actor is at any moment in time, and the choices he or she then can
effect, depend on the actual circumstances and experiences he or she
encounters. Consider the neurologist Antonio Damasio:
[A]s we develop from infancy to adulthood, the design of the
brain circuitries that represent our evolving body and its
interaction with the world seem to depend on the activities in
which the organism engages, and on the action of the innate
bioregulatory circuitries, as the latter react to such activities.45
What causes such genes to switch other genes on or off and thereby
effect our neurobiological development in response to our
environment is our environment; that is, all the unique, non-genetic
experiences each individual encounters.46 The experiences we have,
which include the jobs we hold and the reliance engendered thereby,
and the close and trusting networks we have and acquire, always
produce who we are, and they include every one of our individual
motivational sets, including the creation of and responses to the
existence of a duty. Our unique motivational sets or states include our
"desires, evaluations, attitudes, projects, and so on, ' ' 47  what
philosophers refer to as "intentionality, '4 8 and the development of
those sets define an ongoing phenomenon. The combination of
Factor Imaging with the Atomic Force Microscope, available at
http://www.iscid.org/encyclopediafTranscriptionFactor.
45. DAMASIO, supra note 39, at 111 (emphasis added).
46. See id at 109 (noting that the modem brain works "under the influence of environmental
circumstances complemented and constrained by the influence of the innately and precisely set circuits
concerned with biological regulation").
47. Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame, in MAKING SENSE OF
HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 35 (Benard Williams eds.,1995). There is no doubt that
the job of describing the composition of a state is itself a complex undertaking. Cf David C. Rowe &
Kristen C. Jacobsen, In the Mainstream: Research in Behavioral Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS:
THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 23-24 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothman eds., 1999)
(describing state dependence as a part of a developmental model according to which "past behavior
affects future behavior," such that the commission of a crime, for example, increases the likelihood of
future criminality).
48. FRED DRETSKE, NATURALIZING THE MIND 28-34 (1995).
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genotype and our ordinary experiences thus places some limitations
on the kind of conduct we might expect of ordinary people.
3. Duty from an evolutionary perspective.
Our human genotype came into existence long before anyone
thought about taking collections for the victims of disasters such as
Katrina or the Tsunami of Christmas 2004. On those occasions, we
opened our hearts and our wallets and our talents (and certainly our
prayers) to victims whom we did not know, may never have heard of,
and would never meet.49 Helping simply seemed like the right thing
to do in an interdependent world linked by sophisticated
communications that brought images of devastation to us in real time.
Many of us have reached this stage of moral development, at least on
such occasions. But our moral psychological apparatus began to
emerge in a world that resembled primate communities in which
individuals were far more likely to protect their own and enforce
justice within the clan than help an unrelated comrade. 50 Thus we
might expect that as we evolved, given the history of our genotypes,
we would continue to find it easier to help individuals close to us
than we would perfect strangers and, in either case, especially easier
to give aid if the individual is close at hand. On this view, Katrina
and the Tsunami were epochal, making us aware that everyone may
be in need of assistance for survival. It seems more likely that, in
general, the "social-emotional responses . . . inherited from our
primate ancestors (due, presumably, to some adaptive advantage)"
have shaped our general approaches to morality such that we more
49. See Press Release, Red Cross, International Red Cross Needs For Tsunami Relief Program Met
(Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/0,1077,0_314_4043,00.html
(discussing ongoing efforts to reconstruct to Indian Ocean victims).
50. See, e.g., Joan B. Silk, The Evolution of Cooperation in Primate Groups, in MORAL SENTIMENTS
AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 43 (Herbert
Gintis, et al. eds., 2005); Sara F. Brosnan & Frans B. M. de Waal, Responses to a Simpler Barter Task in
Chimpanzees Pan Troglodytes, 46 PRIMATES 173 (2005); Sara F. Brosnan, Hillary C. Schiff & Frans
B.M. de Waal, Tolerance for Inequity May Increase with Social Closeness in Chimpanzees, PROC.
ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON B, Feb. 7, 2005, at 253, available at
http://www.emory.edulLIVINGLINKS/pdfattachments/BrosnanToleranceO5.pdf.
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readily engage those areas of the brain that bring out our affective
natures when difficult, impersonal moral acts are called for.
5 1
Some support for this conclusion comes in the form of some
ingenious imaging experiments by Joshua Greene and his
collaborators, who have examined the neuroanatomical reactions of
individuals to the well known Trolley Problem, first introduced as a
thought experiment by Philippa Foote and elaborated by Judith Jarvis
Thomson.52 The problem is quite simple: you are conducting a high
speed train when you realize suddenly that the train is on a collision
course with five workers on the track. They are working with jack-
hammers and other noisy tools and are unmindful of any potential
warnings. You recognize at the last moment that you can switch the
train to another track, but one worker who is also oblivious to the
warnings is working on the second track: if you do nothing, five
workers will be killed; if you switch to track two, one worker will be
killed. What should you do? The vast majority of subjects who
respond to the scenario make a quick and relatively easy utility
calculation and throw the switch.53
Change the facts slightly, however, and the same calculation is not
so simple, although the arithmetic is the same. Now suppose the same
fast moving train, the same noisy jack-hammers and other noisy
distractions inducing the same unmindfulness, but this time there is
no side track. Rather, there is a heavy man standing next to you on a
footbridge under which the train will pass before it strikes the five
workers. You can throw the man off the bridge into the path of the
train, which will stop it and save the five workers. What should you
do? Now "[m]ost people say no," 54 I won't do it, and they take a
51. Support for this view comes from some imaginative experiments by Greene and others. See, e.g.,
Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44
NEURON 389, 398 (2004) (finding neural correlates for solving certain moral dilemmas).
52. Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5
(1967); Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985), available at
http://www.jstor.org/pss/796133.
53. Greene et al., supra note 51, at 389-90. See MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: How NATURE
DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL MORAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 32-33 (2006).
54. Greene et al., An.fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE
2105 (2001).
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longer time to reach this conclusion than they did in the Trolley
version.55 Moreover, decision-making in these two circumstances
under fmri visualization shows that different areas of the brain are
involved in reaching these solutions and that the areas evolved at
different points in evolutionary time, the affective emerging well
before the cognitive.
56
Greene and his colleagues have labeled the traditional trolley
problem an example of an impersonal moral dilemma-impersonal
because, in contrast to the footbridge problem, the reaction is driven
more by cognitive brain processes than by affective (emotional)
processes.57 The sub-cortical location of the mechanisms that the
reactions to the trolley scenario trigger are ones that tend, in general,
to respond more cognitively in the aggregate.58 On the one hand, it
would be surprising if, over time, we had not evolved different
processes for different types of moral dilemmas, including those, like
Katrina and the Tsunami, that trigger all our sympathies at once.
Domain-specific processing is the rule rather than the exception in
55. Greene et al., supra note 51, at 389-90.
56. The type of dilemma characterized by the footbridge problem, a serious physical harm, befalling
a particular person or set of people and requiring a hands-on resolution, id at 389, generated substantial
activity in areas of the brain associated with more affective control of reasoning and in the standard
trolley scenario, more activity in areas of the abstract cognitive reasoning. Id. at 398. Greene and his
associates have experimented with a number of different moral dilemmas and each tended to validate the
distinctions between the two main scenarios discussed in the text.
57. Id.; Jonathan Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 12
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 519 (2002), available at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/-jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Haidt-TiCS-02.pdf.
58. "In the aggregate" is an important qualifier because questions about fitness, in general, express
themselves statistically as probabilities. See, e.g., ROBERT PLONIM, NATURE AND NURTURE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN BEHAVIORAL GENETICS ch. 3 (1990); Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson,
Summary of Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, 7 J. CONSCIOUSNESS
STUD. 185 (2000), reprinted in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 185, 187-92 (Leonard D. Katz ed., 2000); Daly & Wilson, supra note 16, at 59 (noting
that what people, as organisms, seek to achieve is 'fitness: the expected value (in a statistical sense) of a
phenotypic design's success in promoting the replicative success of its bearer's genes relative to their
alleles (alternative variants of the same genetic locus), in the environment(s) in which that phenotypic
design evolved"); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 34, at 423 (suggesting that evolutionary theory, among
other resources within biology as a discipline, "can be useful in predicting, at least statistically, both the
environmental causes of [psychological brain] states and the nature of the responses that are likely to
follow") (emphasis added).
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our neuroanatomy, although it is not fixed. The thesis of Greene and
his collaborators goes further still:
[I]t has become clear that natural selection can favor altruistic
instincts under the right conditions, and many believe that this is
how human altruism came to be. If this is right, then our
altruistic instincts will reflect the environment in which they
evolved rather than our present environment. With this in mind,
consider that our ancestors did not evolve in an environment in
which total strangers on opposite sides of the world could save
each others' lives by making rather relatively modest material
sacrifices ....
[T]he evolutionary account . . . suggests [that] we ignore the
plight of the world's poorest [when we do] not because we
implicitly appreciate the nuanced structure of moral obligation,
but because, the way our brains are wired up, needy people who
are "up close and personal" push our emotional buttons, whereas
those who are out of sight languish out of mind.59
Although we should distinguish between our basic architecture,
which Greene and others describe, and the ongoing process of
selection, which suggests some significant phenotype geared for
moving toward a greater radius of empathy, the implications of
Greene's work for the emergence of an AvO as a shared legal
doctrine are important: We were wired to respond to those who are
close to us, often in a family, status or trusting relationship. Over
time and with uniquely individual but sometimes shared experiences,
59. Joshua D. Greene, From Neural "Is" to Moral "Ought": What Are the Moral Implications of
Neuroscientific Moral Psychology, 4 NATuRE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 847, 849 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
For a recent and very accessible account of these issues, see Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, § 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O08/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-
t.html (concluding that numerous additional findings "corroborate Greene's theory that our nonutilitarian
intuitions come from the victory of an emotional impulse over a cost-benefit analysis).
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we have moved our moral emotions outward from the basic units of
genetic fitness; that is, in Humean fashion, from those closest to us
toward others to whom our duties have arisen later in our
evolutionary history. We do understand, as did Hume, that "[w]hat is
honorable, what is fair, what is noble, what is generous, takes
possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain
it.' '60 The evolution of culture, affected by the necessity that follows
vast changes in population and technology, accounts in large part for
the imposition of a contractual duty. But this conclusion is the result
of a struggle to overcome our deepest evolutionary history.6 1
4. Memory and duty.
The imposition of a duty, on the view offered here, arose from an
evolutionary neurobiological commitment made during our distant
ancestors' time, when protecting their own communities and
maintaining their fitness was key. Today our expectations are
different concerning Charlie and Frank; Charlie bears responsibility
for failing to throw the switch. Charlie's position and the
responsibilities he accepts in virtue thereof have implications that
generate expectations at a deep, individual, phenotypic level.
This level implicates the neuroscience of memory creation and
capacity and the many conditions and events that influence our ability
60. See HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 172.
61. In light of the fact that there is often a moral duty where there is no legal duty, it is certainly
appropriate to ask whether these adaptive mechanisms effect the creation and imposition of both moral
and legal duties, or only the latter. Certainly Hume and Smith were concerned primarily with moral
duties rather than legal ones, and thus one is forced to conclude that the answer is that these mechanisms
effect both but that, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, where the violation of a legal duty imposes
financial responsibility on the inadvertent tortfeasor or imprisonment on the guilty criminal, we are more
hesitant to impose legal duties than we are to recognize moral duties. For example, it's worth noting that
not so long ago, a father's financial responsibility to a child was deemed to be an exclusively "moral
duty" that could not be enforced at law. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND *122, *446-54. Only when it became clear that children might be left destitute unless the
father bore a legal duty did courts begin to this convert moral duty into a legal one. Karen Czapanskiy,
Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1436 n.73 (1991).
Moreover, in cultures that often maximize individual freedom and risk-taking, we should not be too
surprised to find that the creation of legal duties follows the creation of moral duties at some distance,
for better or worse. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
197-204 (1973).
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to control both our memory and our behavior; for example, to throw
the appropriate switch in a timely fashion.62 "[W]hen we speak of
learning and memory,... what we are... talking about is the impact
of the environment in the nervous system. It is here that genetics and
the environment become inextricably entangled."6' 3 Allan Gibbard
explains: "The genetic plan for a human being will be full of
contingency plans: full of schemes that in effect say 'If A then do X,
whereas if B then do Y."' 64
Given a difference in how two people act, it is perfectly
biological to say something like this: the two people's genetic
plans [their genotypes] are the same in relevant respects. They've
encountered, though, different cues as to their circumstances.
The cues the two have encountered differ in ways for which the
single genetic plan they share makes provision. The plan they
share is to respond one way given one set of cues and another
way given the other. The cues in question may be immediate
ones, or they may be cues that came years ago in childhood and
have affected the development of psychic mechanisms or the
setting of parameters for them. 65
62. On the adaptive role of memory and learning "under conditions of expectancy," see GERALD M.
EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE: ON THE MATTER OF THE MIND 101 (1992); GERALD M.
EDELMAN & GIULIO TONONI, A UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ch. 8 (2000).
63. WILLIAM R. CLARK & MICHAEL GRUNSTEIN, ARE WE HARD WIRED? THE ROLE OF GENES IN
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 136 (2000). Neuroscientists typically speak of at least two types of memory,
procedural and declarative, where the former describes the effortless execution of tasks that comes from
repeated practice, a kind of "autopilot" effect, and the latter is "explicit, in that we are aware we are
remembering something in the first place." SUSAN GREENFIELD, THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE BRAIN:
EMOTIONS, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE SECRET SELF 66, 67 (2000); accord, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky,
The Prefrontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 1787, 1790
(2004). Others add a third memory module, emotional memory, which has a privileged status in our
brains. See, e.g., Kevin S. LaBar & Roberto Cabeza, Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotional Memory, 7
NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 54 (2006).
64. Allan Gibbard, Genetic Plans, Genetic Differences, and Violence: Some Chief Possibilities, in
GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 169, 173 (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds., 2001).
65. Id. at 174. For example, there is rich data in the neuroscience literature indicating that early
maternal rejection, physical or psychological abuse, and exposure to environmental toxins conduce to
violent behavior as the child matures. See, e.g., Gary W. Evans & Elyse Kantrowitz, Socioeconomic
Status and Health: The Potential Role of Environmental Risk Exposure, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
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Thus, although Charlie and Frank enjoy essentially the same
genome-the difference between the two genomes is approximately
.1% or 3 million base pairs out of roughly 3 billion total66-their
experiences have caused us and them to have different expectations.
Charlie's brain is literally better structured to the task of explicitly
remembering to switch the tracks.
The creation of memory reflects the openness of selection.
Memory is created, in part, from the same forces: similar information
from the environment is repeatedly stored in different mapped areas
of the cerebral cortex. As Gerald Edelman points out, "[m]emory in a
degenerate system is recategorical, not strictly replicative. There is no
prior set of determinant codes governing categories of memory, only
the previous population structure of the network, the state of the
value systems, and the physical acts carried out at a given moment."
67
"Degeneracy" refers to the fact that there are multiple networks for
outputs in a selectional system. 68 "Recategorization" refers to the fact
that when information impinges upon us, it is mapped or
"categorized" in numerous locations in our brains. Memory is the
procedure by which information is repeatedly rehearsed in different
contexts and hence repeatedly stored.69 It is literally the case,
therefore, that "the formation of mental association takes the form of
a new and strengthened connection between neurons."70 And this
303 (2002); Dan Orzech, Chemical Kids-Environmental Toxins and Child Development, 7 Soc. WORK
TODAY 37 (March/Apr 2007).
66. See, e.g., LORI B. ANDREWS ET. AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 27 (2d ed. 2006).
67. EDELMAN & TONONI, supra note 62, at 98. The phrase "value system" is, in some ways, the key
to natural selection. It includes the "phenotypic aspects of an organism that were selected during
evolution and constrain somatic selective events, such as the synaptic changes that occur during brain
development and experience." That is to say, it is composed of those observable characteristics of our
species that define and constrain our developmental functioning. Think about the shape of our hands and
our prehensile thumb, the nature of our perceptual apparatuses, and so on. They provide a framework for
what is possible. In other words, value systems make possible our ability to organize our "perceptions
and behavioral reponse[s]." Values are necessary preconditions to organizing our universes, but they are
not sufficient. They are essential features in the processes that make understanding possible, but alone
they are not adequate to permit understanding. Id. at 88.
68. Id. at 86.
69. EDELMAN, supra note 62, at 102. Other researchers describe this recategorization phenomenon
as "convergence zones," which "make possible the abstract representations that are independent of the
concrete stimulus." JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF 105 (2002).
70. RIDLEY, supra note 44, at 180-81.
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process operates in varying degrees throughout our lives.7' Contexts
that give rise to a "duty" reflect, among other things, repeated
occurrences with the same parties or types of parties in what are
generally pre-existing power or kinship relationships. 72 And poor
Charlie was no neophyte, although newness in the context of a
contractually-imposed duty is no excuse. Rather, he was an
experienced employee who knew better and had the controls
necessary to prevent the collision at his fingertips. And we rightly
blame him for failing.
C. The Knowledgeable Bystander.
Cases in which bystanders easily could but did not intervene to
prevent a potential or ongoing harm are legion. Perhaps the most
notorious of such cases occurred when Kitty Genovese, a single
woman living alone in a large New York apartment complex, was
stabbed to death on three separate occasions over a period of thirty-
five minutes or more while nearly forty of her neighbors (at one or
more times during that period) heard her screams, looked on from
their windows, and failed even to call the police. 73 Each witnessing
neighbor-like Frank, but lacking his forgetfulness excuse-was in
the position to halt (or at least attempt to halt) the deadly harm.
Though we do not ordinarily deem these "Bad Samaritans" to be
causes of death, every potential rescuer is a cause-in-fact of the
death. The attacker initiated and caused her death in the most obvious
dynamic way, each knowledgeable and capable neighbor allowed her
to be killed.
71. SCHWARTZ & BEGLEY, supra note 36, ch. 8.
72. "Generally" acknowledges the fact that with some dependent power relationships, for example,
attorney-client or physician-patient, duties arise as soon as the relationship is created, and sometimes
even before. See, e.g., Dennis P. Duffy, Selected Ethics and Professionalism Issues in Labor and
Employment Law Cases, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSEL
AND THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 998, 1048-50 (American Law Institute, American Bar Association
Continuing Legal Education 2005) (noting that duties of confidentiality may attach even if an attorney-
client relationship is not established, provided the client came to the attorney for legal advice).
73. See, e.g., Martin Gansberg, Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn t Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES,
March 27, 1964, http://www.angelfire.com/comics/mooreportal/kitty.html; Diane Kiesel, Who Saw This
Happen?, 69 A.B.A.J. 1208 (1983).
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Despite that obvious fact, omission liability still (and often) causes
consternation. Many commentators take umbrage when we try to
impose "Bad Samaritan" liability on bystanders, as if providing
minimal assistance was a significant invasion of their time, space,
safety, and peace of mind.74 There certainly are issues that make
imposing a duty on bystanders to give aid problematic, at least some
of the time,75 but some critics experience an uneasiness imposing
liability or attributing culpability even if I stand by and choose to
watch as an unknown two year-old child drowns in a foot of water
when I could easily reach down and pull the child to safety. I would
be a cause of that child's death, although I did not initiate the deadly
force (dynamic or not) that ultimately led to the dreadful outcome; in
fact, this preventable death may have occurred without any wrongful
intent. 76 Although most people, like the judge in Yania, would find
my omission morally reprehensible, they retain the intuition that I did
not legally cause the baby's death. The tendency is to view legal
causation as requiring a dynamic force that leads to serious injury,
and my failure is not typically perceived as either a necessary or
sufficient condition for the child's death.
Why this is so is not entirely clear. There are only hints. Research
using finri technology suggests that areas of the brain involved in
processing social-emotional reactions to moral dilemmas are strongly
aroused in problems akin to providing aid to a drowning child.77 A
clue to what occurs at a more cognitive, intellectual level, though, is
provided by the drafters of the First Restatement of Torts, which the
74. See, e.g., John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 382 (1976) (suggesting that
when the pursuit of one's own interests is a causal factor in an injury suffered by another, some state-
imposed duty to aid may be warranted).
75. Lord Macaulay, for example, was concerned about the circumstances that would give rise to a
duty to aid, the scope of a duty to aid, the potential for harm to the aider, and so on. See Liam Murphy,
Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L. J. 605, 606 (2001) (citing
Thomas Babbington Macaulay, Notes to the Indian Penal Code, in THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY
314-15 (Lady Trevelyan ed., 1900)).
76. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2).
77. Joshua Greene, The Secret of Kant's Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF
MORALrrY 35 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008)), available at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/-jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-KantSoul.pdf, Greene, supra note 59 at 848.
See text accompanying notes 57-59.
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Yania court cited.78 The First Restatement's drafters, publishing in
1923 and 1924, limited the bystander's duty to provide aid to those
circumstances in which the bystander controls the force that causes
the injury. In the drowning child scenario, because I did not control
that force (or even touch the child) the reasoning goes, I owe no duty
to aid the drowning baby at all, not even the lesser duty of rendering
minimal aid. The basis for the intuition appears to be that only the
person who creates or propels the force that produces physical peril
owes a duty of rescue. 79 This is a naive neurobiological response that
seems to have more to do with some form of selfishness rather than
empathy. The tragedy of individuals like Kitty Genovese, who was
brutalized for half an hour as neighbors remained mute behind their
shuttered windows, 80 and the many others who have suffered injuries,
some needlessly, is that we have not moved legislatively, at least, to
harness an evolutionary tendency that is in many circumstances, no
longer necessary to survival.
III. A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF AvO
There is no knockout argument that will settle for all time the
reason why AvO persists. Some matters are nonetheless clear: our
ordinary understanding of the term "causation" is often crude and
flabby, and it frequently masks sub rosa evolutionary developments
and contemporary policy decisions that are, by today's standards,
insufficiently grounded.8' We know that Charlie was a cause of the
crash, but we tend to overlook Frank, a knowledgeable bystander,
whose non-culpable omission consisted of forgetting to remind his
friend Charlie to pull the switch. Additional clues to the persistence
78. Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 345 (1959) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 314 (1934)).
79. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1934).
80. See, e.g., Gansberg, supra note 73; Kiesel, supra note 73.
81. There is nothing new in this assertion. Professor Wes Malone demonstrated fifty years ago what
every well-trained Torts student learns today in the first semester of law school: Even material
causation, "cause-in-fact," often invokes some policy-making decisions. See Wes Malone, Ruminations
on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956) (demonstrating the policy basis for finding material
causation where the structure of wrongdoing is clearly not sufficient to meet the but-for test).
2008l
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1031 2007-2008
] - ISSION  1031 
 7  st t's  
 '   
  
,   
i  lo   
  
    
  t s  i l l 
  79  i l ical  
  s   
 ,  
i       
, so     
   
  l ti  t    ,  
   
   
r  is  t r t t t ill ttl   ll ti  t  
      
 i   tion"  
l ,  it tl     r  ts 
 rary   
i i i tly .sl      
  able  
 l l      
 l  
S. V i  . i ,  .  ,  ( 9) ( iti   )    ». 
.  ( I )    t.  ( ). 
SO. , . ., r , ra t  ; i l,  t  . 
SI. ere is t i  e  i  t is asserti . r fess r s l  str t  fift  r   t 
e er  ell-trai ed rts st t l r s t  i  t  flTSt t r  l  l:  t i l 
causation, "cause-in-fact," often i es s e lic - a ing isi s.  s l , i ti s 
on se-in-Fact,  . . v.  ( 6) ( str ti  t  li  i  f r fi i  t ri l 
ca sati  r  t  str t re f r i  is l rl  t ffi i t t  t t  t  t t . 
29
Blumoff: On the Nature of the Action-Omission Network
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the distinction from Hume, who addressed questions related to the
natural limitations on our capacity for moral thinking; his responses
bear on this topic. Whether we should follow either position presents
separate normative and prescriptive questions.
A. The Humean Analysis
In Hume's analysis of the existence (or not) of a natural tendency
to support the public's interest, he hopes to show that "there is no
such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such,
independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relations to
oneself.' ' 82 He acknowledges that most of us are affected by the
happiness or misery of others, but that such sensibilities raise
different issues, which stem from sympathy. According to Hume,
sympathy lies in the personal capacity we develop through our past
associations and experiences with others, beginning most
significantly at home and within our closest filial relationships. 83 On
Hume's telling, these associations awaken in us certain passions or
emotions.8 4 Consistent with his sense that our passions are stronger
toward those with whom we are in close familial and communal
proximity than toward those whom we know less well, he notes that
we naturally tend to feel closer-to be more partial-to our children
than our cousins, to our cousins than our neighbors, to our neighbors
than strangers, and so on in an arc that moves out in a circle from the
filial center. 85 Hume argues in the Treatise that if there were such a
82. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 481.
83. Hume explains early in the TREATISE that sympathy, like everything else we know, moves
through impressions and ideas from the "relation of objects to ourselves." Id. at 322. Later, and in
remarkably contemporary evolutionary terms, he posits that our necessary capacity for sympathy "is no
other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes, which united them together, and preserves their
union." Id. at 486. Ultimately, as I explain below, sympathy radiates out from the nuclear family and
becomes entwined with that self interest (to produce conventions) which produces morality and justice.
See, e.g., id. at 574-91.
84. Id. (noting that this capacity for sympathy is not something we discern in the mental states of
others, but something we acquire from inferences and impressions we gain based on our observation of
the behavior of ourselves and others).
85. Id. at 486-87 (arguing that the formation of society begins with the union formed "betwixt the
parent and offspring," which mitigates each individual's natural selfishness).
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thing as an original "passion in human minds, as the love of mankind,
merely as such" we should experience it in the same way we
experience the passion we feel for our loved ones, but we do not:
"Were there an universal love among all human creatures, it would
appear after the same manner." 86 The upshot is that we relate to
others according to how they affect us as objects of love and hatred,
not because we have an original psychological motive to public
benefit. Hume acknowledges the existence of generosity "to the
honor of human nature," but he argues that this noble affection
"instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to
them, as the most narrow selfishness." 87 It is only when each of us
comes to appreciate the need to protect our own loved ones and
possessions that conventions, including duties, come into existence.
88
Hume's reasoning is consistent with our knowledge of evolutionary
development.
Hume's moral psychology, which emphasizes our natural desire to
retain the benefits we already possess, supports this view. Hume's
analysis also suggests that the general distinction we draw between
actions and omissions, where the latter is disfavored as a source of
accountability, has less to do with the desire to be let alone-
autonomy, a word we privilege-than it does with some innate
selfishness, since it is clear that, for Hume, all moral action is
generated by an internal natural sensibility. 89 Hume makes the
86. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 481. Hume did understand the value of and need for
normative standards, which he described as "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil." Id. at
47. "The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good, and avoid the evil, tho' they
may be conceived merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future period of time." Id. at 438
(emphasis in the original). Rawls teaches that, for Hume, deliberation is a practiced skill involving an
"imaginative rehearsal" of the consequences of adopting various alternatives." JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES
ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 44 (2000).
87. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 487. As Rawls notes, for Hume the "state of nature" serves as
a "useful fiction in showing the origin of justice in the inconveniences of our selfishness and in the
scarcities in nature." RAWLS, supra note 86, at 57.
88. Hume rarely uses the term "duty," as we use it to describe a legal category for the breach of
which responsibility may lie. Instead, he tends to speak of "obligations," which are not "intelligible
without an antecedent morality." HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 461-62 n.1; see also RAWLS, supra
note 86, at 518 (using the term "duty" to make the same point).
89. This point is stated in many ways, but no where more clearly than in the introductory section of
HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 169-75.
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adaptionist point that because our natural inclinations to love others
declines as we move further from the family nucleus, at the extreme
those inclinations can produce contrary passions, that is, emotional
states that can result in "a consequent opposition of actions. ' 90 Hume
is arguing that our natural affections go only so far, then we put up
boundaries. "Sympathy" for humankind, Hume wrote, "is much
fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons
remote from us much fainter than that with persons [genetically] near
and contiguous.', 91 He explains this predilection to prefer those who
are close in part when he defends the assertion that the contrary
passions are generally offset by three outward circumstances: "[1]
the internal satisfaction of our mind, [2] the external advantages of
our body, and [3] the enjoyment of such possessions as we have
acquir'd by our industry and good fortune., 92 The internal satisfaction
of our mind is secure; no one has access to it. Others can ravage our
bodies, but there's no particular gain to them if they do so. The real
danger is to our possessions, the physical things we work for to attain
some security and maintain personal fitness. They, Hume told us,
"are both exposed to the violence of others, and may be transferr'd
without suffering any loss or alteration." 93 They can be wrongly
misappropriated. To make matters worse, our possessions, which
belong to us and our families, are scarce and desirable; as a result,
they are unstable. We have a natural fear of loss that we strive to
protect.
Hume's understanding of these natural negative passions, the raw
desire to retain our local gains and pleasures and to protect ourselves
and our loved ones from losses, is an important evolutionary
90. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 487; see also David Hume, Of the Dignity and Meanness of
Human Nature, in DAVID HUME: SELECTED ESSAYS 43, 47-48 (Stephen Copley & Andrew Edgar eds.,
1993).
91. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 229. I am not (and could not) suggest that
Hume was indifferent to a sympathy he calls benevolence, which is among the advantageous
approbations any individual can enjoy. But even this quality of generosity is marked by a kind of utility.
Id. at 178-82,218-19,225-32.
92. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 487.
93. Id. at 477-88.
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insight.94 It suggests the existence of some inward-looking, filial
tendencies that must be overcome via cultural evolution before we
are likely to render aid beyond our immediate family and
environment. Within the human species, Hume notes, obligations to
non-filial others exist because we impose them on others. They are
often "artificial" virtues, that is, enforceable obligations imposed
exogenously.
95
There is support from evolutionary psychology for Hume's insight
into the existence of familial and communal roots to our natural
sympathy that comes from studies of kinship selection and reciprocal
altruism in the animal kingdom. Studies of kinship selection predict
that "differences in willingness of individuals to help others will be a
function of their relatedness. The theory of reciprocal altruism
predicts that altruistic behaviors will also be a function of beliefs
about the recipient's likelihood of reciprocating." 96 The idea is that
the pressures of selection and the desire to pass along genetic
material to one's progeny explain why many animals "are more likely
to behave altruistically towards their relatives [and all those closely,
genetically related to them in descending order] than towards
unrelated members of their species." The theory's originator, William
Hamilton, had predicted "that the degree of altruism will be greater,
the closer the relationship. 97 The point here is not that humans
operate exactly as do animals in the wild; that notion is unreasonable.
94. It is at least worth noting that Darwin counted Hume as a central influence on his thinking. See,
e.g., S. Uchii, Book Review, 54 PHIL. AND HIST. OF Sci. NEWSL., KYOTO UNIV. (2004), available at
http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/phisci/Newsletters/newslet_54.html.
95. Id. at 518-19. This is not to say that we do not have any sympathies toward to poor and
miserable because of course we do. Rather, Hume's point is that although the father may have a natural
inclination to care for his young, there is no natural virtue or duty to "perform any action for the interest
of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage." Id. at 519. On the distinction in Hume's
thought between "artificial" and "natural" virtues, see RAWLS, supra note 86, at 51-58.
96. Daniel J. Kruger, Reciprocal Altruism, http://www-personal.umich.edu/-kruger/ep5.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2008) (citation omitted).
97. Samir Okasha, Biological Altruism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/altruism-biological/; see, e.g., W.D. Hamilton, The
Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I and II, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 1-16, 17-32 (1964);
W.D. Hamilton, Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model, 28 NATURE 1218 (1970);
W.D. Hamilton, Altruism and Related Phenomena, Mainly in the Social Insects, 3 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY
AND SYSTEMATICS 193 (1972).
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Our psychological processing is far too complex to be neatly
summarized in any well-turned phrase. Rather, and this does seem to
be both intuitively and empirically clear, we are generally far more
committed to the well being of our family than we are toward
strangers-an insight that is central to Hume's naturalism.
98
Data from primate studies and interdisciplinary studies of
biologically altruistic behavior also provide support for Hume's
position. For example, studies of chimp behavior suggest that these
primates cooperate mainly with "kin and reciprocating partners." 99 If
that is true, it suggests that other-regarding behavior may be a
tendency that co-evolved culturally, a tendency that may not always
have come naturally to our ancestors in the wild. Multi-disciplinary
research on altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation bolsters
this view. This body of work indicates that evolutionary dynamics
vary in ways that make the latter difficult to sustain without some
form of punishment. 100 It would be strange, therefore, if we did not
retain some of our ancestral predilections, like favoring our own
children over the children of others. Evolution, as we know, generally
operates at the level of the gene; altruism among individuals is, in
part, a group phenomenon. 01 The payoff for altruistic conduct among
unrelated individuals will not always be apparent. It may require both
98. Within family contexts, moreover, the parent-child relationship is, from the perspective of
evolutionary psychology, different from other relationships within the family. "[P]arent and child are
genetic relatives with an indissoluable overlap in the expected fitness" or marriage partners. DALY &
WILSON, supra note 16, at 64. In this context, "fitness" refers to "reproductive success not bodily
condition." See, e.g., MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 5 (1988).
99. Joan Silk et al., Chimpanzees are Indifferent to the Welfare of Unrelated Groups Members, 437
NATURE 1357 (2005).
100. DE WAAL, supra note 7, ch. 4; Robert Boyd et al., The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment, 100
PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCL 3531 (2003). Altruistic punishment refers to situations in which an individual
or group incurs the costs of punishing a non-cooperating individual even in a one shot interaction.
Altruistic cooperation refers to situations in which individuals incur the cost of cooperating with one
another in one-shot situations. Id. at 3531.
101. See Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolution of the Human Social Instincts,
in ROOTS OF HuMAN SOCIALITY (S. Levinson & N. Enfield eds., 2006), available at
http://http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/WennerGren0305.pdf.
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morality and the law to impose a duty to move the inertial forces that
rescue, a species of cooperative altruism, demands.
10 2
B. Social Network Analysis
Social Network Analysis (SNA) "is the mapping and measuring of
relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations,
computers, web sites, and other information/knowledge processing
entities. ' 1 3 SNA thus looks at entities and their connections, rather
than individuals, and permits us to conceptualize social structures
among others.1 4 SNA, therefore, centers on patterns of interaction
and the "intuitive notion that these patterns are important features of
the lives of the individuals who display them."'10 5 Put otherwise, the
approach of SNA "focuses on the relations among actors, not
individual actors and their attributes."''0 6
The family is a well-recognized social network. 10 7 An examination
of the component parts of the social network that begins this article
supports our deep intuitions about AvO. The nuclear family-mom,
dad, sister and brother-begins with a map whose "nodes," family
members, in this case, are interdependent and reciprocal; together
they are the basic unit of reproduction, protection and counsel. The
duties of rescue they owe to one another are recognized in both
criminal and tort law, and why not? Historically, survival of the
interconnected family unit and dependency upon coming to one
another's aid insured reproductive fitness.
As our cultural development has evolved and attenuated the
connections within nuclear families-witness the now typical two
102. De Waal summarizes the work of Bemd Heinrich, a biologist who works with ravens, a group
whose composition is constantly changing but whose members, nevertheless, share carrion carcuses. DE
WAAL, supra note 7, at 133-35.
103. Orgnet.com, Social Network Analysis, A Brief Introduction, http://www.orgnet.com/sna.html
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
104. Ulrike Gretzel, Social Network Analysis: Introduction and Resources (2001), available at
http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/tse-portal/analysis/social-network-analysis/.
105. Id. (quoting Lin Freeman, http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/project/1NSNA/na-inf.html).
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wage-earner household-some responsibilities among members of
the family, which were once held within the family or small
community, have been taken over by trusted surrogates. The law and
ethics of the doctor-patient relationship, the lawyer-client
relationship, the clergy-penitent relationship, and others have
formalized the responsibilities once performed within these small
communities. Here it is well to recall a point made throughout this
work: The basic neuro-architecture from which all our reactions
emerge came into existence millions of years ago prior even to small
community living. It is not surprising, therefore, that duties once
performed by members of the family would be assumed by its trusted
surrogates.
C. The Unsettled Case of Kitty Genovese
So why did the crowd that watched or listened to a screaming Kitty
Genovese as she was bludgeoned to death outside her apartment
complex fail to intervene? It should not have been a simple fear for
their own safety because an anonymous or feigned identity call to
911 (or its then contemporary counterpart) would have met the
fundamental ethical requirement for fulfilling the duty to intervene.
Still no one called. Was it the fear of, or simple aversion to, "getting
involved?" Was it the feared slippery-slope of helpfulness, as in the
Yiddish expression, "No good deed goes unpunished?"' 0 8 Was it the
unsupportable belief that someone else will come to her aid, known
as the bystander effect, according to which the more witnesses to an
emergent event, the less likely any witness will take responsibility
and intervene? 10 9 And if these explanations, or excuses, are
108. The expression may have many sources; I have relied on my mother for the source stated in the
text.
109. JOHN DARLEY & BIBB LATANE, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER (1970); John Darley & Bibb
Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).
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essentially correct, l l they too implicate selfishness, at least in a
substantial, if not causatively distinct way.
Hume's naturalized view of how humans tend to behave provides
an explanation that has empirical corroboration in contemporary
neuroscience. In the absence of a legally imposed duty, the strength
of our concern for the well-being of others generally dissipates as
those others radiate farther away from our lives, from immediate
family to distant family to friends to neighbors and so on. 11 Thus, we
impose duties to come to the aid (or refrain from harming by culpable
omission) as a function of salient distance, which we measure
(generally) in terms of kinship networks and relationships of
authority or power that operate interdependently with those units and
members thereof. This also accounts, in part, for the irregularity of
the sentiments that Smith explained. The nearer we are to the victim
of harm, either in a first order kinship relationship or another
recognized category that expresses a relationship of trust, power, and
authority between individuals, the more likely we are to react to both
the harm and the intentions that produce it. 112 On this explanation,
Kitty Genovese was just another stranger, although one who was
geographically proximate to a host of potential rescuers. That
proximity exacerbates our feeling of moral outrage but it does not
fully close the gap between rescuer and unrelated victim.
110. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder on Affirmative Duties to Help
Strangers, 71 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1993).
111. This is not necessarily a utilitarian position; it may also be deontic insofar as it understands that
duties trump consequences. Hume measured duties, however, non-categorically; he had no patience with
or thoughts about categorical imperatives. Rawls describes this as a failure to have a theory of practical
reasoning. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 45-46. Perhaps. For a description of Hume's understanding of our
natural proclivities, see David Wiggins, Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty,
75 THE MONIST 83, 84 (1991) (noting that Kant also believed that humans "come into the world
endowed by their constitution with the strong sentiment of self-love and the weak sentiment of
benevolence").
112. See Theodore Blumoff, Some Thoughts on the Aesthetics of Retribution, 17 CAN. J.L. &
RELIGION 233, 239-43 (2004) (discussing Smith's effort to naturalize harm).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF MORALITY AND AvO
The account offered here is mostly descriptive; evolution is not
itself a normative process. The Humean conceptions of morality and
justice tie into this process by emphasizing our natural fitness
tendencies and the artifices needed to overcome these dispositions.
Love of self predominates and the virtues of altruism and help for
distant, unrelated others are not features of our evolutionary wiring,
although they are features of contemporary life. 113 As a culture, too,
we tend to forgive or accept and excuse mere forgetfulness, such as
Frank's, more readily than we forgive observable "positive"
negligence or duty-bound omissions.
114
In a Humean world of naturalized morality, intimate and
asymmetric relationships that help maintain fitness are associated in
networks of trust and experience. Each relationship develops over
time with the accretion of the vast stores of learning, dependence, and
commitments biological and otherwise that come therefrom. Control
in stable and secure liberal democratic countries, for better and for
worse, sometimes requires compromises with Kantian elements of
normativity, which impose certain categorical duties.1 5 And trust and
intimacy, which define healthy first-order family relationships and
generally diminish in valence as they move outward, often only occur
with the ongoing experiences that come of parent-child and spousal
relationships. Duties, as a characteristic of Humean justice, follow
from all the knowledge we gain as a consequence of our experiences,
some of which require that we contain our own selfishness."16
113. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 3, at 480.
114. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt & Jonathan Baron, Social Roles and the Moral Judgement of Acts and
Omissions, 26 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCH. 201, 217 (1996).
115. This, of course, was the subject of Kant's Groundwork . KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS 60 (H. J. Paton, trans., 1873).
116. In the section on Of Morals in the Treatise, in which Hume describes the origins of justice, he
also describes the natural defects in our uncultivated natures-among which are our "natural temper"
and "selfishness"--that are remedied by artifice, the "infinite advantages" of helping one another via the
justice. HUME, TREATISE supra note 3, at 486-89. For an excellent discussion of these sections, see
RAWLS, supra note 86, at 56-61.
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ACTION-OMISSION NETWORK
That we limit liability for forgetting to those circumstances in
which explicit memory is required may be a natural response to
human frailty-that is, to the absence of experiences that, as a matter
if fitness, require our ability to remember on a timely fashion.
Explicit memory is more likely to be formed in circumstances that
make continuous personal demands on us than in circumstances less
likely to make such demands: "Old memories are the result of
accumulations of synaptic changes in the cortex as a result of
multiple reinstatements of the memory."'1 17 Thus, when we are forced
to pay attention to our task, as we are when our job performance or
our children's well-being depends on it, our memory of the events
that occur improves.11 8 In this view, it is reasonable to conclude that
Charlie's failure was more "causal/intentional" than Frank's; at least
Charlie had deeper reasons in terms of both neuro-and moral
psychology to remember the switch than did Frank. In this context,
negligence seems to serve as a trip-wire because it speaks to a form
of misconduct from which each of us suffers in common. Oddly then,
for all our complaints that Bigan should have helped Yania get out of
the trench, almost inexplicably the law has not changed.
CONCLUSION
Our law treats actions and omissions that cause harm differently,
routinely imposing liability for the former but not on the latter unless
the omission violates a duty. The law takes this position despite the
fact that observers routinely find many omissions morally
blameworthy. This essay hopes to provide some explanation for this
distinction in evolutionary psychology. It thus began by clearing just
enough underbrush to reach the fairly unobjectionable conclusion that
omissions can be just as effective at causing harm as acts. Thereafter
117. LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF, supra note 69, at 107; accord Edelman & Tononi, supra note 62, at
95 (noting that memory is a process of "selective matching that occurs between ongoing, distributed
neural activity and various signals from the world, the body and the brain," which results in synaptic
alterations).
118. See MICHAEL GAZZANIGA, THE MIND'S PAST 128 (1998).
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it addressed the question of why, in light of that fact, legal doctrine is
less likely to find liability for preventable harms that result from
omissions than from acts. Hume's view of the limits of natural
sympathy suggests that imposing a general duty to aid strangers in
need does not come to us naturally from within. Evolutionary theory
and research in neuroscience provides some support for Hume's
conclusion, and for the need to find a status relationship as a
condition for imposing a legal duty.
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